ABSTRACT Recently, data mining over transactional data streams has become an attractive research area. However, releasing raw transactional data streams, in which only explicit identifying information must be removed, may compromise individual privacy. Many privacy-preserving approaches have been proposed for publishing static transactional data. Due to the characteristics of data streams, which must be processed quickly, static data anonymization methods cannot be directly applied to data streams. In this paper, we first analyze the privacy problem in publishing transactional data streams based on a sliding window. Then, we present two dynamic algorithms with generalization and suppression to anonymize continuously a sliding window to make it satisfy ρ-uncertainty by structuring an affected sensitive rules trie, because the removal and addition of transactions may make the current sliding window fail to satisfy ρ-uncertainty. Experimental results show that our methods are more efficient than sliding window anonymization with batch processing by using existing static anonymization methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy-preserving data publishing provides methods and tools for publishing useful information while preserving individual privacy. Recently, it has received wide attention from academia and industry, and many approaches have been proposed for different data publishing scenarios [1] - [7] . Transactional data (or set-valued data) refers to data in which each record (or transaction) consists of a set of items drawn from a universe of items [8] , [9] . With the advent of big data, the data may arrive continuously at high speed, leading to a potentially unbounded and ever-growing dataset called a data stream [10] . Publishing transactional data streams provides enormous opportunities for various data mining tasks, such as frequent pattern mining for a wide range of online applications including retail chain data analysis, network traffic analysis, and web-server log and click-stream analysis [11] . However, disclosing raw transactional data streams may compromise individual privacy. Recent work has studied the privacy problem for publishing static transactional data. Nevertheless, due to the characteristics of data streams, these techniques cannot be directly applied to transactional data streams. We investigate the privacy protection problem for publishing transactional data streams, which is more challenging than that for publishing traditional static datasets.
A data processing model is required to extract transactions from continuously generated data streams. Data stream mining techniques are classified into three categories according to the stream processing models: the landmark window model, the damped window model and the sliding window model [12] . In the landmark window model, these transactions from a specific point of time, called the landmark, to the current time are considered. In the damped window model, each transaction has a weight that decreases with time. In the sliding window model, a fixed length of recently arrived data is considered, i.e., given a window on a transactional data stream, only the latest w transactions or all transactions in the last w time units are utilized for data mining; these windows are called the transaction-sensitive window and timesensitive window, respectively. As new transactions arrive, the oldest transactions in the sliding window are removed and the new transaction is inserted. The sliding window model is widely used for stream mining, because processing recent data is usually important for applications that handle streamoriented data [11] , [13] - [17] .
Due to the wide application of sliding windows for data analysis, we consider the privacy problem in processing data stream based on a sliding window. We assume that the recipients of a published data stream are untrustworthy and include the researcher for data mining and other attackers. If an attacker has partial knowledge about a subset of items corresponding to a victim, he/she may attempt to infer sensitive information about the victim. For example, consider a supermarket that released its transactional data stream to a data mining company for marketing strategy analysis. Mike from the data mining company is analyzing the data, and he happened to know that his friend Lily bought wine, milk and scissors from this supermarket yesterday, so Mike knows that the transaction appears in a particular sliding window. If there is only one transaction containing wine, milk and scissors in the sliding window, Mike can immediately infer that this transaction corresponds to Lily, and he can determine her complete shopping bag contents. If the transaction contains some sensitive items, such as a pregnancyTest, Lily's privacy is revealed. In this paper, two privacy-preserving approaches for transactional data streams based on a sliding window are proposed. Fig. 1 shows an overview of the transactional data stream mining environment. We dynamically anonymize the sliding window to make it satisfy ρ-uncertainty, a privacy model proposed in [18] . These anonymization methods for static transactional data are time-consuming, and are not suitable for processing the sliding window over a data stream. Our major contributions are summarized as follows: 1) For a transactional data stream, when the sliding window, which satisfies ρ-uncertainty, is updated, the removal and addition of transactions may make the sliding window fail to satisfy ρ-uncertainty. We analyze the effect on privacy caused by deleting a transaction with/without sensitive items or by adding a transaction with/without sensitive items. 2) By structuring an affected sensitive rules trie ASRT, we first present a dynamic algorithm with only suppression to continuously awnonymize a sliding window to make it satisfy ρ-uncertainty. Then, to decrease the information loss, we present a dynamic anonymization algorithm by combining generalization and suppression. 3) Experimental results show that our methods are more efficient than sliding window anonymization with batch processing by using the static anonymization methods proposed in [18] .
The paper is organized as follows. We review the related literature in next section. In Section 3, we give some related notions, and analyze the effect on privacy by removal and addition of transactions in a sliding window. The structure of an affected sensitive rules trie and two dynamic anonymization algorithms are presented in Section 4, and experimental results are described in Section 5. In the last section, we conclude this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the related work about privacypreserving data publishing for transactional data and data streams, which are directly relevant to our approaches.
A. PRESERVING PRIVACY FOR PUBLISHING TRANSACTIONAL DATA
Transactional data is high-dimensional, and the traditional privacy protection methods for relational data are not adapted directly for transactional data. The existing research on anonymizing transactional data for the purpose of data mining can be divided into two categories according to whether the items are distinguished as sensitive and non-sensitive [8] .
In the first case, the distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive is eliminated, and all items are considered to be equally sensitive. Terrovitis et al. [19] proposed the k m -anonymization model, which assumes the background knowledge of an adversary is at most m items and is a relaxation of k-anonymity for relational data [20] . They achieved k m -anonymity by global generalization. Liu and Wang [9] provided an anonymization method by integrating suppression and generalization. However, it is difficult to bound the background knowledge of an adversary. He and Naughton [21] did not restrict the background knowledge, and applied k-anonymity to transactional data, which means that for any transaction, there are at least k − 1 other identical transactions. Additionally, they proposed a top-down local generalization to achieve k-anonymity.
In fact, it is reasonable to divide all items in the universe into sensitive and non-sensitive. Ghinita et al. [22] assumed that an adversary has background knowledge of an arbitrary number of non-sensitive items, and proposed a permutation method that first groups transactions with close proximity and VOLUME 6, 2018 then associates each group with a set of diversified sensitive values. Xue et al. [23] anonymized data in a generalized form by nonreciprocal recoding instead of using a permutation and generalization hierarchy tree. Xu et al. [24] introduced (h, k, p)-coherence by confining an attacker with maximum knowledge of p items to identify each transaction from k others in which no more than h% share a common private item. Additionally, they utilized global suppression with the goal of preserving as many item instances as possible. The methods above all assumed that an adversary's background knowledge is restricted to non-sensitive items. However, an attacker may also obtain partial knowledge about sensitive items. Therefore, Cao et al. [18] proposed the ρ-uncertainty privacy model, which does not allow an attacker knowing any subset of a transaction t to infer a sensitive item α ∈ t with confidence greater than ρ, and they anonymized transaction data by suppression and generalization.
B. PRESERVING PRIVACY FOR PUBLISHING DATA STREAMS
Data streams are continuous, transient, and usually unbounded [25] , and some research on privacy-preserving data publishing in relational data streams has been published. Cao et al. [25] , [26] presented a cluster framework to continuously anonymize data stream with k-anonymity or l-diversity [27] with maximum allowed delay guarantee δ between incoming data and the corresponding anonymized output. Guo and Zhang [28] proposed a novel k-anonymization approach for data streams based on clustering by considering the time constraints on tuple publication and cluster reuse, to accelerate the anonymization process and reduce the information loss. Li et al. [29] proposed the SKY method based on the specialization tree to continuously facilitate δ-constraint k-anonymity on data stream for privacy protection. These methods all enforce a user-defined time constraint to limit the delay of the published data, and consider anonymizing nearly-expired data. This process damages the utility of the anonymized data. Zhou et al. [30] developed a novel approach for k-anonymizing a stream of relational data, which creates and fills clusters with arriving data elements, and publishes them when the clusters satisfy k-anonymity. Also, they considered the statistical distribution of the data stream to limit information loss due to generalization. Kim et al. [31] presented delay-free anonymization by using the accumulation-based method to preserve the privacy of electronic health data streams. The method does not generate an accumulation delay, because the input streams are anonymized immediately with counterfeit values. They further devised late validation to increase the data utility of the anonymization results and to manage the counterfeit values.
Data ming usually focuses on finding and extracting useful information from recently arrived data elements, since processing recent data is usually important for applications that handle stream-oriented data. The sliding window is an efficient and commonly used approach to handle or mine contin- uously generated data streams [11] . The above anonymization methods for data streams do not guarantee that every sliding window satisfies a given privacy requirement, and still lead to privacy leakage. The problem of privacy protection based on a sliding window is challenging because the sliding window is updated frequently and rapidly. Wang et al. [32] proposed a sliding window anonymization framework SWAF to solve this problem for relational data stream by continuously facilitating k-anonymity on a sliding window. Al-Hussaeni et al. [33] devised an incremental trajectory stream anonymizer to incrementally anonymize a sequence of sliding windows on trajectory stream under the LKC-privacy requirement [34] . We consider privacy preserving for publishing transactional data streams based on sliding windows. are the window size and window identifier, respectively. For convenience, Table 1 summarizes the symbols used in this paper.
A transactional data stream based on sliding window is shown in Fig. 2 , where the window size and step size are 6 and 2, respectively. The items a 1 , a 2 , b 1 and b 2 are nonsensitive, and α and γ are sensitive. Transactional sliding window TSW i+1 2 contains transactions t i+1 , . . . , t i+6 . When new transactions t i+7 and t i+8 arrive, the oldest 2 transactions t i+1 and t i+2 are deleted from the transactional sliding window, and the current window is TSW i+3
Assume that Mike knows that Lily bought a 2 and b 1 from a store on one day and that the store publishes its shop-23650 VOLUME 6, 2018 ping data stream for mining, as shown in Fig. 2 . We also assume that Mike can monitor the data stream by sliding window, and knows the transaction of Lily in TSW i+3 2 . Then, Mike can infer that Lily also bought γ , so Lily's privacy is compromised.
A. PRIVACY MODEL ρ-uncertainty is a privacy model for publishing static transactional data [18] , and we extend it to data streams. Assume that an attacker can monitor a data stream by sliding window model, and knows a subset of items χ of the victim's transaction t in a transactional sliding window. If an attacker can infer with high probability that t contains χ and it also contains a sensitive item α from the transactional sliding window, where α / ∈ χ, the privacy is compromised. It means to mine the association rule χ → α from the transactional sliding window, where χ is the antecedent and α is the consequent. Such an association rule is called a sensitive association rule (SAR). The confidence of a SAR χ → α in a transactional sliding window TSW i can be computed by sup(χ ∪ α)/sup(χ ), where sup(χ ) is the number of transactions in TSW i which contains χ. To prevent these inferences, we need to anonymize every transactional sliding window and require that the confidence of each SAR appearing in a transactional sliding window is less than a threshold value ρ.
Definition 3.1: For a transactional data stream TDS, a transactional sliding window TSW i over TDS is said to satisfy ρ-uncertainty if and only if for ∀t ∈ TSW i , ∀χ ⊂ t, and ∀α / ∈ χ, α ∈ I S , the confidence of the SAR χ → α is less than a threshold value ρ, ρ ∈ (0, 1]. If any transactional sliding window satisfies ρ-uncertainty, then TDS satisfies ρ-uncertainty.
B. THE ANALYSIS OF VIOLATING PRIVACY FOR SLIDING WINDOW
When a sliding window satisfies ρ-uncertainty, as p new transactions arrive, the window slides forward, i.e., the oldest p transactions in the sliding window are removed and the new p transactions are inserted into the window. The current sliding window may violate ρ-uncertainty because of the deletion and addition of transactions. In the following, when a sliding window satisfies ρ-uncertainty, we analyze the influence of the deletion or addition of a transaction on the privacy of the sliding window.
Theorem 3.1: Assume that a sliding window satisfies ρ-uncertainty. For a transaction t, it contains the set of items I t . When t is deleted from the sliding window, we have 1) any SAR χ → α in the sliding window, in which χ ⊆ I t and α / ∈ I t may violate ρ-uncertainty; 2) any SAR χ → α in the sliding window, in which χ I t and α ∈ I t does not violate ρ-uncertainty; 3) any SAR χ → α in the sliding window, in which χ ⊆ I t and α ∈ I t does not violate ρ-uncertainty. Proof: For any SAR χ → α, we know that its confidence can be computed by sup(χ ∪ α)/sup(χ) and sup(χ ∪ α)/sup(χ) < ρ, i.e., the association rule satisfies ρ-uncertainty. When t is deleted from sliding window, we consider the following cases.
1) For any SAR χ → α, in which χ ⊆ I t and α / ∈ I t , sup(χ ∪ α) is not changed, and sup(χ) is decreased.
2) For any SAR χ → α in which χ I t and α ∈ I t , it is clearly that the deletion of t does not influence the confidence of the association rule. 3) For any SAR χ → α in which χ ⊆ I t and α ∈ I t , i.e., χ ∪ α ⊆ I t . We have that
where sup(χ ∪ ¬α) represents the number of transactions which contain χ but does not contain α. When t is deleted, sup(χ ∪ α) is decreased, and so
is decreased. The sensitive association rule does not violate ρ-uncertainty after t is deleted. Theorem 3.2: Assume that a sliding window satisfies ρ-uncertainty. For a transaction t, it contains the set of items I t . When t is added to the sliding window, we have 1) any SAR χ → α in the sliding window, in which χ ⊆ I t and α / ∈ I t does not violate ρ-uncertainty; 2) any SAR χ → α in the sliding window, in which χ I t and α ∈ I t does not violate ρ-uncertainty; 3) any SAR χ → α in the sliding window, in which χ ⊆ I t and α ∈ I t may violate ρ-uncertainty. Proof: The proof is similar Theorem 3.1. When the sliding window is updated, it may violate ρ-uncertainty. According to Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, we need to consider only these SARs, which may violate ρ-uncertainty. If we utilize the static anonymization method proposed in [18] , all the SARs in the current sliding window are checked for whether they violate ρ-uncertainty.
C. INFORMATION METRIC
For a transactional data stream TDS, if a transactional sliding window TSW i over TDS does not satisfy ρ-uncertainty, we can transform it to satisfy ρ-uncertainty by generalization and suppression. For the items in I N , a generalization hierarchy tree is constructed, in which a leaf node represents a non-sensitive item, an internal node represents a generalized value for some items, and the root is the generalized value for all items. This process is identical to that in [18] . An example is shown in Fig. 3. a 1 , a 2 
where sup(a) is the number of transactions in TSW i that contain a. Definition 3.3: For a transactional data stream TDS, the average information loss of the sliding window is
where ω is the number of different sliding windows.
IV. ANONYMOUS ALGORITHM FOR PUBLISHING TRANSACTIONAL DATA STREAMS
To calculate the confidence of a SAR χ → α, the supports of itemsets χ and χ α must be computed. For a transactional sliding window TSW i , we can transform it into a soft set [35] , [36] . Let U be an initial universe set, E be a set of parameters and η ⊆ E, and P(U ) be the power set of U . A pair (F, η) is called a soft set over U , where F is a mapping given by F : η → P(U ). For TSW i , let U be the set of transactions appearing in TSW i , E be the set of items I , and η be the subset of items appearing in TSW i . Then, F(a) is the set of transactions which contain item a in TSW i , a ∈ η. The support of a is |F(a)|. For ∀a, b ∈ η, the support of ab is |F(a)∩F(b)|.
For the TSW i+1 2 in Fig. 2 , the corresponding soft set (F, η) is
The support of a 1 is |F(a 1 )| = |{t i+2 , t i+5 }| = 2, and the support of a 1 a 2 is |F(
Our purpose is to dynamically anonymize the sliding window to make it satisfy ρ-uncertainty. We can use the static anonymization method for every transactional sliding window. However, because the sliding window is updated frequently and rapidly, an efficient algorithm is needed. When the sliding window is updated, it does not satisfy ρ-uncertainty because of the deletion and addition of transactions. We need to find and handle only the affected SARs that may violate ρ-uncertainty. We first introduce the suppression algorithm, and then propose the generalization algorithm with suppression.
A. SUPPRESSION ALGORITHM
To avoid the generation of false association rules [37] , we use global suppression. A suppressed item is deleted from all transactions in a TSW i which contain it. The initial sliding window is anonymized by SuppressControl in [18] . When the sliding window is updated, the anonymous sliding window may not satisfy ρ-uncertainty due to the removal and addition of transactions. We use Algorithm 1 to continuously handle it and make it satisfy ρ-uncertainty.
Let TSW i be the anonymous window of raw window TSW i and I i supp contains the suppressed items from TSW i . In line 1, the initial TSW i+1 is obtained by sliding forward TSW i with step size p in the transactional data stream TDS, i.e., TSW i+1 = TSW i \W del ∪ W add , where W del is the set of deleted anonymous transactions and W add is the set of added raw transactions. To ensure that there are no false association rules in the anonymous sliding window, in lines 2 to 6, if an item has been deleted in previous anonymized processes from the raw transactions about TSW i \W del , we delete the item in W add . In line 8, we build the ASRT according to these transactions in W del and W add to find the SARs which violate ρ-uncertainty, and then suppress them by suppressing some items in TSW i+1 . Finally, we obtain the anonymous sliding window TSW i+1 which satisfies ρ-uncertainty. In Algorithm 2, we first initialize ASRT, find the violated SARs whose antecedent length is 1, and suppress them by suppressing some items in TSW i+1 . In lines 5 to 9, when the nodes of the levth level are not ∅, we continue to build the next level nodes, find the violated SARs whose antecedent length is lev and suppress them by suppressing some items. lev + +; 10: return TSW i+1 ;
Algorithm 1 SuppTDS(TSW i
,
Algorithm 2 BuildASRTandSupp((F
In Algorithm 3, we first initialize ASRT which contains the root node and the first level nodes. I w is the set of the first level nodes, which consist of sensitive items appearing in TSW i+1 . Let root → α → i 1 → . . . → i i be a path in ASRT, where α ∈ I w and i 1 , . . . ,
For 3: update (F, η);
4:
if S del = ∅ then 5: for i s ∈ S del do 6: update the values of i s ' children contained in I del \i s , and delete the child from ASRT if its value is ∅; 7: for i s ∈ I w \S del do 8: if i del ∈ I del is not an child of i s in ASRT and F(i s ) ∩ F(i del ) = ∅ then 9: add i del as a child of i s ; 10: for t add ∈ W add do 11: update (F, η); 12: if S add = ∅ then 13: for i s ∈ S add do 14: update the values of i s ' children contained in I add \i s , and add it as a child of i s if there exists i add ∈ I add \i s which does not appear in ASRT ; 15: return ASRT ;
In Algorithm 4, we find the set SAR lev of violated SARs with antecedent size lev from the ASRT. Then we use the payoff tree [18] to delete the SARs in SAR lev by deleting some items, and these deleted items are saved to Supp ASRT , as shown in line 4. In line 5, we update (F, η), ASRT and TSW i+1 according to Supp ASRT .
In Algorithm 5, when the set of the levth level nodes is not ∅, we build the lev + 1th level nodes. For an affected SAR χ → α, we know that χ ⊆ α dchild , where α dchild is Algorithm 4 Suppress (ASRT , lev, ρ) 1: for every SAR Rule in ASRT do 2: if Rule violates ρ-uncertainty then 3: Add it to ASR lev ; 4: Supp ASRT = payoff (ASR lev ); 5: update (F, η), ASRT and TSW i+1 according to Supp ASRT ; 6: return Supp ASRT ; the set of α' direct children. For every leaf i leaf of the levth level in ASRT, there is an affected SAR i 1 . . . i leaf → α, where root → α → i 1 → . . . → i leaf is a path from root to i leaf . Next, for every sibling node i lsib of i leaf , we check whether the NewRule i 1 . . . i leaf i lsib → α violates ρ-uncertainty. If value(i leaf ) ∩ F(i lsib ) = ∅, i.e., i 1 . . . i leaf i lsib α appears in TSW i+1 , and there is a transaction which contains the antecedent of NewRule, denoted by Ant(NewRule), but does not contain α in Win del , i.e., consequent of NewRule, denoted by Con(NewRule) (Theorem 3.1(1)) or there is a transaction which contains i 1 . . . i leaf i lsib α in Win add (Theorem 3.2(3)), the confidence of NewRule is affected. We add i lsib as a child of i leaf . Then, the algorithm returns ASRT .
Algorithm 5 BuildNextLevel(ASRT)
1: for every leaf i leaf of levth level in ASRT do 2: for every sibling node i lsib of i leaf do 3: if value(i leaf ) ∩ F(i lsib ) = ∅ and (∃t del ∈ W del (Ant(NewRule) ⊆ t del ∧ Con(NewRule) / ∈ t del ) or ∃t add ∈ W add (NewRule ⊆ t add )) then 4: add i lsib as a child of i leaf ; 5: return ASRT ;
B. GENERALIZATION ALGORITHM WITH SUPPRESSION
Similar to suppression, we use global generalization to avoid the generation of false association rules [18] . For a generalization hierarchy tree H, global generalization maps all instances of an item, as well as all items of the same subtree of hierarchy H to the same level in H [22] . The algorithm TDControl [18] anonymizes static transactional data by applying global generalization over the hierarchy tree H of the non-sensitive items in I N along with selective global suppression of some items, to make the data satisfy ρ-uncertainty. In this paper, we use TDControl to anonymize the initial sliding window. When the sliding window is updated, the removal and addition of transactions may make the sliding window fail to satisfy ρ-uncertainty. We use Algorithm 6 to continuously handle it and make it satisfy ρ-uncertainty.
The particularization tree T is a part of H and contains the root of H [18] . The set of its leaves denotes the generalization case of the current window. In line 1, the initial TSW i+1 is obtained by sliding forward TSW i with step size p in the transactional data stream TDS, i.e., TSW i+1 = TSW i \W del ∪ W add . In lines 2 to 6, to ensure that there 13: while Gene = ∅ do 14: comsplit = Special(Gene); 15: if comsplit==0 then 16: break; 17: return TSW i+1 ; are no false association rules in the anonymous sliding window, if the items in leaves(i supp ) (i supp ∈ I i supp ) have been deleted in previous anonymized processes from the raw transactions about TSW i \W del , we delete them in W add . Then, we generalize the items in W add according to the current particularization tree T , and save the generalized values in W add to Gene. We do not generalize sensitive items, because that would reveal sensitive information [18] . In line 9, we call the BuildASRTandSupp function to suppress some sensitive items and to ensure that the SARs, which contain sensitive items only, do not violate ρ-uncertainty. Additionally, we update (F, η), TSW i+1 , W del and W add according to Supp ASRT . In line 12, we build the ASRT to find the SARs, which violate ρ-uncertainty, and combine generalization and suppression to handle them. Then, we check whether information loss can be decreased by specializing the items in Gene in lines 13 to 16. Finally, we obtain the anonymous sliding window TSW i+1 .
In Algorithm 7, we initialize ASRT which contains the affected sensitive rules with antecedent length 1. In line 2, we combine generalization with suppression to handle the SARs which violate ρ-uncertainty. When the set of levth level nodes in ASRT is not ∅, we continue to add nodes for the next level, find the violated SARs with antecedent length lev, and handle them by generalization and suppression, as shown lev + +; 10: return TSW i+1 ; in lines 5 to 9. Finally, we obtain an anonymous sliding window TSW i+1 .
In Algorithm 8, we first find the set SAR lev of violated SARs in ASRT whose antecedent size is lev. When ASR lev = ∅, we find the item i x in ASR lev with the maximum payoff ratio [18] . Should we generalize or suppress it? We select the way which causes less information loss, as shown in lines 6 to 10. Due to generalization or suppression, there may exist SARs whose antecedent length is less than lev. These SARs do not violate ρ-uncertainty, so we delete them from ASR lev . In line 11, we update (F, η), ASRT, TSW i+1 and Gene according to Supp ASRT and T . Then, we return Supp ASRT .
Algorithm 8 GeneOrSupp(ASRT , lev, ρ)
1: for every SAR Rule in ASRT do 2: if Rule violates ρ-uncertainty then 3: Add it to ASR lev ; 4: while ASR lev = ∅ do 5: select item i x with maximum payoff ratio; 6: if LosSupp(i x ) ≤ LosGene(i x ) then 7: suppress i x in ASR lev ; 8: put i x into Supp ASRT ; 9: else 10: generalize i x in ASR lev ; 11: delete the SARs whose antecedent length is less than lev; 12: update (F, η), ASRT, TSW i+1 and Gene according to Supp ASRT and T ; 13: return Supp ASRT ;
In Algorithm 9, we use the infoGain function [18] to find the item i split in Gene with the maximum information gain. If the information gain of i split is less than 0, then there is no item to specialize; otherwise, we specialize i split . That is, we remove i split from Gene, and update (F, η) and TSW i+1 with the children of i split .
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of our algorithms SuppTDS and GeneSuppTDS in terms of data quality and efficiency by comparison with approaches that anonymize the sliding window with batch processing by using the static anonymization methods SuppressControl and TDControl [18] . The algorithms are implemented in C++, and run on a computer with a four-core 3.2GHz CPU and 8GB RAM running Windows 7.
In our experiments, we use two datasets, BMS-WebView-2 and BMS-POS, which are introduced in [38] and are benchmarks in the data mining community. Their characteristics are described in Table 2 , where max|t| and avg|t| represent the maximum and average transaction size, respectively. As the items are not differentiated into sensitive and nonsensitive items, we randomly select 40% of the items as sensitive items. The default values of the window size w, step size p and privacy requirement ρ are 10000, 50 and 0.5, respectively.
We consider the information losses by varying the dataset, and the values of the window size w, step size p and privacy requirement ρ, as shown in Figs. 4 to 7. Fig. 4(a) shows that the average information losses of GeneSuppTDS and TDControl are less than those of SuppTDS and SuppressControl, because the former combine generalization and suppression, while the latter use only suppression. The average information loss of SuppTDS is the same as that of SuppressControl, because we use the same method to handle the SARs which violate ρ-uncertainty. The difference is that our SuppTDS finds the SARs which violate ρ-uncertainty by scanning only W del and W add , while SuppressControl needs to scan the whole sliding window. The average information loss of GeneSuppTDS is near that of SuppressControl. For every sliding window, GeneSuppTDS and TDControl first call SuppTDS and SuppressControl to find and handle the SARs which violate ρ-uncertainty and contain only sensitive items, respectively, and the information losses caused by them are same. Then, TDControl applies a top-down particularization method by initially assuming that all items are generalized to the top level of H. It greedily selects the generalized item for particularization with max- imum information gain until the maximum information gain is less than 0. GeneSuppTDS utilizes the W del and W add to find the SARs which violate ρ-uncertainty and considers generalization or suppression of items according to the information losses they cause. Finally, the algorithm checks whether the information loss can be reduced by particularizing some generalized items. TDControl and GeneSuppTDS both ensure that further particularization does not decrease the information loss. Therefore, their information losses are near for a sliding window.
The execution time of algorithms is showed in Fig. 4(b) . The efficiency of our SuppTDS and GeneSuppTDS is higher than that of SuppressControl and TDControl, because SuppressControl and TDControl need to consider the whole sliding window, while our algorithms scan only W del and W add to anonymize the sliding window. GeneSuppTDS requires more time than SuppTDS, because GeneSuppTDS first handles the ASRs which contain only sensitive items by suppression, then deals with the ASRs whose antecedent does not contain sensitive items by generalization and suppression, and finally particularizes some items to decrease information loss, while SuppTDS scans only W del and W add to find and handle the SARs which violate ρ-uncertainty.
As the results in the two datasets show similar trends, next we use the BMS-POS data to test the performance of our algorithms and the comparison algorithms.
Form Fig. 5(a) , we can see that the average information losses of the four algorithms decrease with increasing w. Because the larger w is, i.e., the more transactions there are in w, the lower the probability of a SAR violating ρ-uncertainty is. In Fig. 5(b) , when w increases, i.e., the number of transactions in a sliding window increases, the execution time of the algorithms increases. As shown in Fig. 6(a) , when the step size p increases, the average information losses of the four algorithms decrease. Since the intersection of two sliding windows decreases with increasing step size, the influence of suppression and generalization in previously anonymized processes decreases to the current sliding window. In Fig. 6(b) , when p increases, the execution time of the algorithms increases. With increasing p, the number of newly arrived transactions in a sliding window increases, so there are more items to be handled. For SuppTDS and GeneSuppTDS, they need to handle more transactions because of the increase in W del and W add .
The performance of algorithms with varying privacy requirement ρ is shown in Fig. 7 . Fig. 7(a) shows that the average information losses for the four algorithms decrease with increasing ρ, because the larger ρ is, the weaker the privacy preservation is, and the smaller the number of SARs violating ρ-uncertainty is. From Fig. 7(b) , we know that execution time is minimally affected by increasing ρ, because the algorithms can quickly handle the SARs violating ρ-uncertainty.
VI. CONCLUSION
Data mining over transactional data streams is one of the most important problems with broad applications. However, the privacy problem in publishing transactional data streams has not attracted sufficient attention, and the existing static data anonymization methods cannot be directly applied to data streams. In this paper, we present two rapid anonymization methods with generalization and suppression to ensure that every anonymous sliding window satisfies ρ-uncertainty and that the information losses are near to those caused by batch processing with the existing static anonymization methods.
